Yezaiman proposed
Yokohama as a new location for a meeting. But would the Americans agree and
what other hurdles did Perry faced to achieve his goal of a treaty. Explore the
obstacles that Perry and the Japanese commissioners faced before signing a
landmark treaty that changed Japan forever.
Prelude to the
Meeting
For
days after Yezaiman proposed Yokohama as the location for the meeting between
Commodore Matthew Perry and the Japanese commissioners, American survey boats
scouted the shores of the village. Scouting parties reported that Yokohama had a perfect harbor for
the squadron. Few days later, Yezaiman went on board the flagship Powhatan with
a translator Moriyama Yenosuke, who later became a diplomat. They handed over a letter of credence for the Japanese representatives. They included Hayashi Daigaku no Kami, Lord Izawa of Memasaki, Lord Ido
of Tsushima and Udono Mimbusco. Then, Yezaiman and Captain Adams had small
discussion on American request for coal and other provision as per letter of
the President. Finally, the meeting between Perry and the Japanese
representatives was set on March 8, 1854.
Initial Meeting
Between Perry and the Japanese Commissioners
On
March 8, 1854, Commodore Perry prepared for his conference. He ordered his
warships to line up in the coast in anticipation of any hostilities. Before
leaving for the shore of Yokohama, he received news that an additional
commissioner just arrived – Matsusaki Michitaro, a high official in the Bakufu.
Talks
were to be conducted in what the Americans called the “treaty house.” The
official narrative of the expedition descried the location:
“… the “treaty house,” was placed upon a level plain near to the shore, and contiguous to the village of Yokohama… The treaty house had been hastily erected of unpainted pine wood, with peaked roofs, and covered a large extent of ground, having a reception hall of forty to sixty feet in area, and several adjoining apartments and offices. From each side extended yellow canvas screens divided into panel-like squares by black painted stripes. On the exterior walls of the building was spread a dark cloth, upon which was represented in bright colors some device which was said to be the arms of the third commissioner, Izawa, Prince of Mimasaki.”
The
Japanese saw the enclosure as to bring privacy and dignity to the event, but
Perry thought otherwise. He viewed the place a “pen.” In military
standpoint, it provided cover for the Japanese from the gunfire of the warships
in case of the worst scenario. He then ordered his officers to demand the removal of
the enclosure under the threat of cancellation of the meeting. The Japanese complied
and immediately removed the enclosure.
At
eleven o’clock, Perry set out for the shore. Like before, he went along with
500 sailors, marine, officers, and a musicians. Before noon, Perry embarked
from the Powhatan signaled by the roar of the guns of the Macedonian in respect. After
Perry landed, the party set out in an impressive parade along with a lively
band said to be playing the Star Spangled Banner. At the treaty house, the
talks between the Commissioners and Perry began. The Japanese commissioners
handed over their government’s reply to the President's letter.
The reply stated Japan’s incapability to provide immediate reply to the demands of
the President. Nevertheless, they allowed American ships to resupply
in Nagasaki. Perry then discussed the creation of a treaty between the
United States and Japan and suggested using the treaty between China and the
United States as a basis.
The US-China Treaty of 1844
The
treaty Perry pointed out was the Treaty of Wanghia signed in 1844 between the
United States and the Qing Empire. It guided American access to China in five
different ports. It set the tariff rates for trade and the rules concerning
maritime issues, such as treatment of shipwrecked sailors and warships, pirate
attacks, and conditions of American ships during wartime between China and other
foreign powers. It provided the proper channels for issues such as disputes and
debts. It gave Americans extraterritoriality rights within China. The
deal was comprehensive that settled American activities within
China and Perry wanted it to be the basis for a treaty with the Japanese.
Notes from Commodore Perry
In
addition to using the Wanghia Treaty as a framework, Perry also submitted a
note to the Japanese commissioners with additional proposals. In the note, he
urged the Japanese to safeguard the safety of American sailors, and to allow setting
up signal poles in the coast of Edo Bay. In another note he submitted, he
argued to the Japanese that Americans had the desire of securing the welfare of
their country as well as that of Japan. He added that trade between the two
countries would result to additional opportunities for Japanese living in America. After Perry submitted his notes and received a draft of the reply of
the Japanese “Emperor” to the letter of the American President, the meeting
concluded.
On
the very next day, the Japanese official handed over the official copy of the
reply letter. Moreover, an event for the exchange of gifts between the two
countries was discussed and planned.
Exchange Gifts between Japan and the United States
After
much deliberation since March 9, finally, the Americans gave the gifts of the
United States to Japan on March 13. The gifts included weapons, inventions, as well as
innocent civilian items. But the inventions turned out to be the most
interesting for the Japanese.
Various
types of weapons were given as presents to the Japanese Emperor. New and modern
rifles, muskets, carbine, and pistols were given in addition to various swords.
Then came civilian and peaceful items, such as books, perfume, and a telescope.
Various beverages followed like wine, champagne, and tea. In addition, Clocks
and a chart of standard American measurements were presented to the Japanese.
But
the most sought after by the commissioners and other officials was the miniature
train set. The Americans assembled the sizable rail and placed the locomotive
and its carts, where a person could ride on. To the amazement that hit the playfulness of the officials, the train set worked.
Some Japanese officials even rode the train set like children riding a carnival
ride. Indeed, it was a peaceful and unusual episode in a serious talks
concerning the future of a country.
Treaty Talks Resumed
After
the turnover of gifts. Discussions on the terms for an agreement pressed
on. The Americans presented what they want, and the Japanese presented their
reply and their terms. Compromises were needed to be made. And eventually, a
compromise indeed happened.
From
March 14 to 15, the Americans asked for the opening of Napha in the Lew Chew
Islands and Matsmai in the Northern Japan. A conference between the commissioners
and Perry was supposed to be held in March 16, but the weather prevented it
from happening and was eventually moved to the following day, on March 17. The
commissioners bluntly rejected using the Sino-American Treaty as a reference on grounds of
different situation and laws. They remained adamant in allowing immediate
trade. They proposed trade to be conducted in Nagasaki for five years as a
trial period before deciding whether to open other ports as well. And trade in
Nagasaki would commence not immediately but in the following year.
Nevertheless, they affirmed allowing castaway Americans’ welfare as well as
provisioning American ships under the condition of payments in form of gold and
silver coins.
Japan
added new stipulations for the agreement and Perry gave them a reply. As stated
above, Japan agreed to open Nagasaki to American ships for provisions. American
sailors drifted to Japan would be sent to Nagasaki, however, officials would
have to constrict their movements for security purposes such as possibilities
of a castaway being a pirate. They also wanted Americans to refrain from
interacting with the Dutch and the Chinese. “Deliberation between the parties”
would also be needed during the sale of goods and services within the ports.
Concerning the opening of the Lew Chew Islands and Mastmai, the Japanese
government in Edo had no power over them.
The
Japanese stipulations showed their prevailing concerns and hesitations. They
agreed to most of the request from the letter of President Fillmore, except for
the immediate opening of the entire country to trade. They consented in opening
Nagasaki to American ships but their activities of trade was limited to buying
supplies and only allowed within five years as they took on the letter’s
proposal of a trial period of five years. Moreover, even though they agreed to
secure American castaway sailor’s welfare and provisioning American ships,
they wanted to limit their movements under security pretext of piracy. They
limited supplying ships to Nagasaki and even asked for non-interaction between
the Dutch, Chinese, and the Americans. Edo washed its hands over the issue of
Lew Chew and Matsumai, but even in this part, it had facts set up. Lew Chew
answered to Satsuma Domain while the north, Matsumai answered to their local
Daimyo.
Perry
prepared and presented his reply. He welcomed Japanese decision to open
Nagasaki but he urged them to open another port as Nagasaki was not in any
American shipping routes. He bluntly and profoundly rejected Japan’s
stipulation to constrain the movements of American sailor drifted to Japanese
coast due to their paranoia on pirates. And he equally gave an infatuating no
to Japanese demand of prohibiting Americans from interacting with the Dutch and
Chinese in Nagasaki, which he found insulting. Perry, however, agreed to some
Japanese proposals, such as the sending of shipwrecked ships and sailors to
Nagasaki or whatever port designated to Americans, deliberation on sale of goods and services in the port, as well as
Japan’s non-interference on the issue of the Lew Chew Islands. Perry also
decided to hold separate negotiations with the Daimyo of Matsmai.
After
giving his response to Japanese demands, he gave another one to the Japanese
commissioners. Because Nagasaki laid away from any American routes, Perry
sought to open an alternative ports, he wanted to open either Uraga or
Kagoshima. The Commissioners rejected both, but they did presented Shimoda as
another alternative. Shimoda was far away from Edo and more
convenient to the Americans as it laid in the Idzu (Izu Peninsula) and closer to the Pacific
Ocean
Another
issue that arose concerning ports was Matsumai. The commissioners informed
Perry that they and Edo had no power and control over the opening of that port,
because another Lord had the power over the area. Perry demanded the Japanese
government to convince Matsumai to open or he himself would go to Matsumai to
conduct the negotiations. The commissioners asked until March 23 to give their
answer. After the talks, Perry had the Vandalia and Southampton survey Shimoda.
On
March 23, the commissioners’ reply arrived. Moriyama Yenosoke, the interpreter
that went with Yezaiman, passed to the Americans the reply of the Japanese
commissioners. They decided to offer the port of Hakodadi (Hakodate) instead of
Matsumai. They added that Hakodadi offered a much better harbor that Matsumai.
Perry and American officials considered the offer.
On
March 24, 1854, gifts from the Japanese government arrived. It included
lacquered furniture and paper boxes, silks, plates and trays, corals, silver
feathers, bamboo stands, and even umbrellas. The Japanese also gave a dog to
Commodore Perry as a gift. After the gifts, they offered entertainment to the
Americans, giving them a show of their imposing Sumo wrestling. Samuel
Williams, the Chinese interpreter of the expedition, described the spectacle as
“a curious, barbaric spectacle, reminding one of the old gladiators.” On the
27th of May, the Americans treated the commissioners with a drill on board of
the Macedonian, complete with a demonstration of weapons of the warships. The
Americans then hosted them to a dinner with entertainment from minstrels, which
also baffled the Japanese. During the dinner, the commissioners enjoyed various
wine, meat, and pastries of the Americans. Also, the Americans presented the commissioners
with four large cakes designed with the flags of the two countries and the coat
of arms of the commissioners. The party ended well in good spirits.
Next
day, talks resumed. Perry received reports from the Vandalia and Southampton
that Shimoda was a good port. He also agreed to Hakodate as an alternative to
Matsumai. Other several pressing issue was resolved during the meeting, such as
the opening of the ports was to be within ten month and not immediately. He
also agreed to limit the area in Shimoda where Americans could go – seven
Japanese miles or ri from the city center. The Japanese then accepted Perry’s proposal that a consul
would only be appointed a year after the signing of the treaty and not
immediately.
Perry
consented to some of the Japanese demands. He did not want to force the
Japanese too much so as not to break their good faith. Nevertheless, a Treaty
of Friendship seemed to be imminent from that point.
Kanagawa Treaty of
Peace and Amity
On
March 31, 1854, Perry signed the historic Treaty of Peace and Amity in Kanagawa
(Yokohama) with the Japanese commissioners, Hayashi, Ido, Izawa, Udono, and
Matsusaki. The two parties met in the “treaty house” and the two sides signed the four copies of the Treaty – a Chinese, Dutch, English, and
Japanese versions of the agreement.
The
agreement promised “perfect, permanent, and universal peace, and sincere and
cordial amity” between the two countries. It opened Shimoda and Hakodate to
American ships to purchase supplies. Any American castaway or ship wrecked in Japan would be brought to the assigned ports. It also gave
American freedom to roam around Shimoda within the 7 ri from the city center. The agreement secured that any
goods or “business” required by ships, “deliberation between the two
parties” would be made. It allowed Americans to “exchange gold and silver
coins” for any goods purchased in the ports. “Wood, water, provisions, coal,
and goods required” were only to be procured from Japanese officials. It
virtually granted the Americans the status of most favored country as it gave
them the same privilege that Japan would give to any other nations. It allowed
American ships to dock in non-designated ports in case of emergency. Lastly, it
secured the appointment of a consul to reside in Shimoda eighteen months after
the signing of the treaty.
Perry
himself knew that the treaty fell short in opening all ports of Japan for
trade. Nevertheless, he saw the treaty as a foundation for any future agreements.
At least he achieve getting two ports open for American ships, secured a place
for a consulate as well as the welfare of castaway sailors and a coal station
for American ships. But most of all, Perry secured Americans privileges that Japan would give to any foreigners much credit to the most favored country status stated in
the Treaty of Kanagawa.
The
Japanese on the other remained adamant and cautious. They allowed the opening
of Japan due to fears of hostility. But they did open carefully by limiting
the area where Americans could roam around, and they secured opening ports away
from Edo, which they could regard as a best thing out of a bad situation. They
also managed to delay any negotiation of complete opening of Japan to trade
with the United States. The trial period of five years gave Japan a breathing
space to realize the condition of Japan in a rapidly changing world.
Explore
also:
Documents in History: Reply to the 1852 Letter of President Fillmore
Documents in History: Treaty of Kanagawa
Documents in History: Treaty of Kanagawa
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