After Perry ended his
first visit, the Japanese reacted differently on what to do next. Meanwhile,
the Russians arrived demanding the same thing as Perry. Explore the divide
within the Japanese government and the arrival of the Russians.
Japanese Reaction
Shogunate
officials went on a crisis mode after Perry left in July 1853. With the
Shogun Tokugawa Ieyoshi ill and dying, much of the decision making power went
to the chief elder of the ruling council – Abe Masahiro. He faced the difficult
task of deciding whether to agree to the American demands and open Japan or
maintain the country isolated, which in case, might lead to military
confrontations. Abe wanted to study the situation further and its implication
by unexpectedly and unprecedentedly asking the advice of various Daimyos or local
lords.
Never
before the Shogunate asked the advice of the Daimyos. Most if not all powers in
the land was centralized to the Shogunate. So Abe’s actions were unheard of.
After Perry left, the Letter of the President of the United States to the
“Emperor” of Japan was translated and distributed among the Daimyos. Along with copies of the letter, Abe asked for their stand. The answers revealed a division on opinions.
Some
sought to maintain isolation, while others stood for the opening of Japan. From the former, the extreme
nationalist group believed in the retention of the Sakoku or Closed-Country policy. Tokugawa Nariaki, a
prominent Daimyo of Mito, a relative of the Shogun, and an ally and friend of
Abe Masahiro, believed Japan must stand up against the foreign
“barbarians.” He even sent a memorial to Abe right after Perry’s departure. It
stated ten reasons why Japan should not concede to the barbarians.
On the memorial he boldly reasoned for war. He first stated
that such act, allowing foreigners to roam Japan, would be a disgrace to their
generation and their forefathers. Americans would spread Christianity, which
Nariaki dubbed as an “evil sect.” Trade would be detrimental to Japan as it
would cost its precious metals for “trashy little articles.” He viewed giving
trade right to Americans meant giving other Europeans the right as well. He reminded what happened to China might and possibly happened also to Japan. He implied
that trade would be one sided as Japan had no capability to engaged in trade
across oceans and seas.
Moreover, he showed to the Shogunate that samurais went to Edo in anticipation
of conflict, and he wrote, “Is it wise to disappoint them?” He reminded the
Shogunate that the actions in Uraga embarassed the daimyo in Nagasaki, who held the traditional position of handling foreign affairs. He added allowing the barbarians act so arrogantly, undermined the position of
the Shogunate even to the poor and the illiterate. And lastly, he argued that
war with the foreigners would awaken the martial spirit of the Japanese people,
which had became dull and weak due to the long peace that the country experienced. These became his main arguments in pushing for
war against the Americans or any foreigner that would arrive in Japan’s shores.
Tokugawa
Nariaki’s belief came as a result of growing nationalism developing in his
domain of Mito. One of Mito’s famous scholar Aizawa Seishisa wrote the Shinron or the New Theses published in
1825. In the New Theses, Aizawa criticized the weakness of the Bakufu in terms
of defense and the problems of centralizing too much power to Edo. Eventually,
Aizawa’s work inspired many isolationist and nationalist Japanese decades
after its publication. His idea resulted to a slogan that isolationist and
nationalist used – jo-i, expel the
barbarians.
Others,
however, accepted trade and opening of Japan to foreigners with reservations.
For centuries, Dutch learning or Rangaku prevailed in the Southern Japan, in
particular in Nagasaki and the Satsuma Domain. When Abe asked for the stand of
various Lords, the Daimyo of Satsuma, Shimazu Nariakira, advised to open the
country. Another influential Daimyo, Ii Naosuke also believed that Japan needed
to open up its door. But, most of those who stood in opening Japan believed in
moderation. They agreed to trade, because the realities of politics said so, but they do not agree to concede too much to foreign
demands. They believed that trade must be made profitable to finance the
strengthening of their country’s defenses – an idea that later developed into
the famous Meiji Era slogan of Fukoku
Kyohei, strong economy, strong army. W. G. Beasley wrote in The Modern
History of Japan, many of the Daimyo’s agreeing to the abolition of the Sakoku
believed “Trade was inevitable… not
desirable.”
Some also supported the opening of Japan or at least adopting western technologies. In
the southern domains, adoption of Western technology proliferated. Satsuma
domain used Dutch technology to make weapons and used European training to
strengthen their forces. Edo approved it especially after Perry’s first arrival. A
scholar of the Rangaku, Sakuma Shozan, coined the famous phrase “Toyo dotoku, Seito gakugei” or western
learning and eastern ethics, which became the slogan of Japanese who
welcomed foreign technology and interaction.
Arrival of the Russians
While
the Shogunate mourned the passing of their Shogun Ieyoshi and they searched for
their course of action, the Russians arrived to negotiate border issues and trade. Luckily for Japan, conditions in Europe
turned Putiatin’s attention away from Japan for quite some time.
In
August 1853, Admiral Yevfimy Putiatin arrived in Nagasaki aboard his flagship
the Pallas and accompanied by the
warship Diana. They came as a result
of news they received on Perry’s expedition in Uraga Bay, as they monitored
America’s advancement in the Pacific with weary as it threatened their interest
in the region. For a month, Putiatin attempted to negotiate a treaty of
friendship with the Japanese as well as settle the issue of borders in the
Kuril Islands. However, he met difficulties and delays.
Abe
Masahiro the chief elder of the governing was not yet even finish in deciding
on what to do with the Americans. The arrival of the Russians further burdened
the government and Abe attempted to delay the negotiations with them. He used the mourning period for the death of Shogun Ieyoshi. Putiatin, however, threatened
to sail to Edo itself. But then Abe informed them through a letter that negotiators
from Edo would be coming to Nagasaki to begin talks. Putiatin estimated the
arrival of the negotiators would arrive in January 1854 so sailed back to Shanghai for the meantime to repair and resupply.
On
January 1854, Putiatin returned to Japan to start negotiations with the
Japanese. The Japanese agreed to settle the issue of the northern borders but
hesitant on the issue of trade. By February 1854, negotiations bore no fruit
and Putiatin decided to leave Nagaski. Nevertheless, the Japanese promised the
Russians status of most favored country in future treaty negotiations.
Putiatin,
however, failed to secure a treaty with the Japanese in 1854 due to political developments in Europe. The Crimean War broke out and Russia fought
with Britain and France, and the conflict reached Asia. Putiatin received
orders to evade capture or destruction of the Russian Pacific fleet from the
Anglo-French naval forces in the region. Thus, it took a year before Putiatin
concluded a treaty with the Japanese in Shimoda.
Although
Putiatin failed to secure a treaty with the Japanese, Perry felt threatened after
hearing the news of Russian warships arriving in Nagasaki. He feared that the
Russians might get ahead of him in securing a trade deal with the Japanese. As a response, he decided to return to Japan for a reply earlier than what
he promised.
Explore also:
Bibliography:
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